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Despite the success of available medical and psychosocial treatments, a sizable
subgroup of individuals with commonly co-occurring disorders, generalized anxiety
disorder (GAD) and major depressive disorder (MDD), fail to make sufficient treatment
gains thereby prolonging their deficits in life functioning and satisfaction. Clinically,
these patients often display temperamental features reflecting heightened sensitivity to
underlying motivational systems related to threat/safety and reward/loss (e.g., somatic
anxiety) as well as inordinate negative self-referential processing (e.g., worry, rumination).
This profile may reflect disruption in two important neural networks associated
with emotional/motivational salience (e.g., salience network) and self-referentiality
(e.g., default network, DN). Emotion Regulation Therapy (ERT) was developed to
target this hypothesized profile and its neurobehavioral markers. In the present study,
22 GAD patients (with and without MDD) completed resting state MRI scans before
receiving 16 sessions of ERT. To test study these hypotheses, we examined the
associations between baseline patterns of intrinsic functional connectivity (iFC) of the
insula and of hubs within the DN (anterior and dorsal medial prefrontal cortex [MPFC]
and posterior cingulate cortex [PCC]) and treatment-related changes in worry, somatic
anxiety symptoms and decentering. Results suggest that greater treatment linked
reductions in worry were associated with iFC clusters in both the insular and parietal
cortices. Greater treatment linked gains in decentering, a metacognitive process that
involves the capacity to observe items that arise in the mind with healthy psychological
distance that is targeted by ERT, was associated with iFC clusters in the anterior and
posterior DN. The current study adds to the growing body of research implicating
disruptions in the default and salience networks as promising targets of treatment for
GAD with and without co-occurring MDD.
Keywords: generalized anxiety disorder, major depressive disorder, worry, somatic anxiety, decentering, resting
state functional connectivity
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DISTINCT FUNCTIONAL CONNECTIVITIES
PREDICT CLINICAL RESPONSE WITH
EMOTION REGULATION THERAPY
Generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) and major depressive
disorder (MDD) are prevalent and impairing conditions when
they occur alone. However, when they co-occur, GAD and
MDD are associated with increased public health burden and
are more treatment refractory (e.g., Whisman et al., 2000; Stein
and Heimberg, 2004; Farabaugh et al., 2010; Newman et al.,
2010; Tully et al., 2013). Psychological models characterize GAD
and MDD as conditions illustrative of a profound disruption
between mind and body motivated by a fraught attempt to
avoid unpredictability and acute intense emotionality brought
about by actual or perceived threat (GAD) or actual or
perceived loss/reinforcement deprivation (MDD). Specifically,
individuals with GAD and/or MDD characteristically respond to
aversive and often conflicting emotional and somatic experiences
with the use of repetitive or perseverative reactive cognitive
processes such as worry and rumination (Mennin and Fresco,
2013). These processes are enacted to create control and
predictability, but instead more often result in vacillation
between a worried or ruminative mind and chronically distressed
body. When individuals are momentarily successful in staving
off the aversive experience of strong emotional responses
by invoking such self-evaluative processes, reliance on these
self-evaluative processes is reinforced (Borkovec et al., 2004;
Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; Watkins, 2008; Newman and
Llera, 2011; Mennin and Fresco, 2013, 2014; Olatunji et al.,
2013). Similarly, behavioral activation models of depression
posit that depressive rumination serves an avoidance function
by promoting unhelpful self-reflection on one’s negative events
instead of engaging behavioral actions to respond or resolve
the particular circumstances (e.g., Ferster, 1973; Jacobson et al.,
2001; Papageorgiou and Wells, 2004). As a result, worry and
rumination are associated with considerable deficits in cognitive
and behavioral responding (e.g., Lissek, 2012; Whitmer and
Gotlib, 2012) as well as an inferior treatment response and greater
relapse (e.g., Jones et al., 2008).
Although worry may temporarily reduce acute and intense
somatic arousal, over the long run, it may actually promote
persistent negative emotions and physical stress (e.g., Brosschot
et al., 2006; Newman and Llera, 2011). For instance, ambulatory
monitoring studies indicate that individuals with GAD as
compared to healthy individuals have relatively higher heart
rate (e.g., Hoehn-Saric et al., 2004). Similarly, laboratory
studies utilizing worry induction methodology reveal that worry
is associated with greater heart rate and skin conductance
(e.g., Vrana and Lang, 1990; Lyonfields et al., 1995; Thayer
et al., 1996). Relatedly, individuals with GAD evidence
chronically low vagal tone especially in relation to worry
(Thayer et al., 1996; Brosschot and Thayer, 2003; Hoehn-
Saric et al., 2004; Brosschot, 2010), which may reflect a
diminished physiological flexibility brought about by the
physiologic changes induced by chronic anxiety. As a result
of this diminished capacity for physiological self-regulation,
individuals may become increasingly reliant on maladaptive
strategies such as repetitive thought to manage distress
(e.g., Hoehn-Saric et al., 2004). Similarly, the relationship
between worry and physiological arousal may reflect the
very way that individuals with GAD learn to cope with
negative emotionality. Individuals with GAD commonly exhibit
paradoxical acute anxiety when instructed to relax (e.g., Heide
and Borkovec, 1984) and express greater success in coping
with fear and sadness inducing probes with worry as compared
to relaxation or neutral instructions (e.g., Llera and Newman,
2010).
In an effort to synthesize these transdiagnostic features of
GAD and MDD, Mennin and Fresco (2013, 2014) have posited
an emotion dysregulation model, in which these conditions are
marked by heightened emotional experience (i.e., motivational
intensity) coupled with repetitive and perseverative forms of
self-referential thinking (i.e., worry, rumination, self-criticism)
that serve as compensatory strategies to reactively escape
or avoid strongly felt emotional and somatic experiences.
The combination of these clinical features may reflect an
underlying profile or endophenotype common to GAD and
MDD, and may also account for the relative underperformance
of otherwise efficacious treatments in resolving these conditions,
particularly when comorbid (e.g., Olatunji et al., 2010). A
greater focus on the underlying features of emotionality
and self-referentiality may provide a more refined target of
investigation than simply examining diagnostic symptoms of
GAD. This model is congruent with transdiagnostic approaches
to these conditions (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema and Watkins, 2011)
and is consistent with the Research Domain Criteria project
(e.g., Insel et al., 2010), which represents an effort to leverage
our knowledge of both normative and disordered human
functioning at many levels of analysis (e.g., genetic, molecularly,
neural, behavioral, socio-cultural, etc.,). Using an experimental
therapeutics framework, the Research Domain Criteria promotes
investigations of novel intervention principles for their action
on biobehavioral targets in hopes of producing superior
and enduring clinical improvement (Kozak and Cuthbert,
2016).
Negative self-referentiality and intense emotionality, the
primary characteristics of the endophenotype posited in
Mennin and Fresco (2013, 2014) emotion dysregulation model,
correspond to two well researched neural networks: the default
network (DN; e.g., Raichle et al., 2001) and the salience
network (SN; e.g., Craig, 2009; Menon, 2015), respectively. In
particular, self-referentiality is commonly associated with neural
activation in the DN, regarded as a network associated with
autobiographical, self-monitoring and social cognitive functions.
The DN is anchored by activity in the medial prefrontal
cortex (MPFC; narrative and autobiographical self) and the
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC; experiential self-reflection;
e.g., Buckner et al., 2008; Qin and Northoff, 2011; Brewer et al.,
2013).
The MPFC is also implicated in the detection of emotionally
salient stimuli (Morris et al., 1998; Phillips et al., 2003), agentic
or aspirational self-reflection (Johnson et al., 2006, 2009), and
determining whether beliefs are ‘‘acceptable’’ or ‘‘unacceptable’’
(Paulus and Stein, 2010). Similarly, the PCC has been implicated
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in self-reflection especially in relation to duties and obligations
(Johnson et al., 2006, 2009). Psychiatric disorders are often
marked by excessive activation of the DN thereby preventing
or delaying purposeful activation of neural regions associated
with executive control (e.g., Whitfield-Gabrieli and Ford, 2012)
as well as undermining cognitive load and emotion regulation
capacities (e.g., Brewer et al., 2011; Whitfield-Gabrieli and Ford,
2012). With respect to GAD and MDD, resting state fMRI
studies clearly implicate disruption inDN regions (e.g., Hamilton
et al., 2011, 2013; Chen and Etkin, 2013; Andreescu et al.,
2014; Wang et al., 2016). Similarly, task-based studies examining
trait levels of worry or depressive rumination (e.g., Paulus and
Stein, 2010; Hamilton et al., 2011) or instructions to worry or
ruminate (e.g., Cooney et al., 2010; Paulus and Stein, 2010;
Ottaviani et al., 2016) demonstrate neural activations in nodes
of the DN.
The SN governs our attention to the external and internal
world (Menon and Uddin, 2010), and as such, integrates sensory,
emotional and cognitive information to facilitate optimal
communication, social behavior and self-awareness (Menon,
2015). A critical node of the SN is the insular cortex, which
has been implicated in interoceptive awareness (e.g., Mussgay
et al., 1999; Critchley et al., 2004; Craig, 2011; Farb et al.,
2015), and afferent information that arises from anywhere
and everywhere within the body (Cameron, 2001). Greater
interoceptive awareness is associated with increased anxiety and
panic, especially when those bodily sensations are catastrophized
(Schandry, 1981; Ehlers and Breuer, 1992; Barlow, 2002; Pollatos
et al., 2009; Paulus and Stein, 2010) during self-referential
processing, such as in worry (e.g., Pollatos et al., 2009; Paulus and
Stein, 2010). This self-referencing may thus exaggerate arousal
(i.e., positive or negative). According to Paulus and Stein (2010),
individuals with anxiety and depression exhibit a reduced signal
to noise ratio of interoceptive afferents: interoceptive signals
have a propensity to be interpreted negatively, resulting in
increased sympathetic arousal, and in turn, increased escape
or avoidance behaviors. Consequently, low fidelity interoceptive
afferents result in overactive top-down brain modulatory areas
(e.g., MPFC) that engage constantly to differentially amplify or
attenuate body signals.
The insula is thought to also serve a role in evaluating the
impact of stimuli on the body (Paulus and Stein, 2006), including
generation and regulation of affective responses and detection
of emotionally salient stimuli (Paulus and Stein, 2010). Focus
has been on the right anterior insula (e.g., Critchley et al., 2004)
but increasingly, evidence also indicates a role for the posterior
insula (e.g., Simmons et al., 2013; Kuehn et al., 2016) as well
as bilateral insulae (e.g., Stein et al., 2007; Avery et al., 2014).
Neuroimaging studies support the contention that disorders such
as GAD and MDD are associated with SN abnormalities. For
instance, compared to healthy individuals, depressed patients
show reduced connectivity between anterior insula and other
nodes of the SN (Yuen et al., 2014). Consistent with the
predictions of Paulus and Stein (2010), task-based studies with
MDD and GAD patients consistently show hyperactivity of the
anterior insula often accompanied by increased connectivity
with nodes of DN including the PCC (e.g., Paulus and Stein,
2010; Hamilton et al., 2013; Yuen et al., 2014). Similarly, a
recent study by Kaiser et al. (2015) found that in comparison
to healthy control participants, patients with MDD evidenced
increased connectivity of the MPFC to the insula and the
strength of this connectivity was predictive of depression
severity.
In contrast to the maladaptive relationship between negative
self-referentiality and intense emotionality (e.g., somatic arousal)
proposed in the emotion dysregulation model of Mennin and
Fresco (2013, 2014) in their emotion dysregulation model,
decentering represents a metacognitive process that involves the
capacity to observe items that arise in the mind (e.g., thoughts,
feelings, memories, bodily sensations) with healthy psychological
distance, greater self-awareness and perspective-taking (Safran
and Segal, 1990; Fresco et al., 2007a,b; Bernstein et al., 2015).
Depressed individuals tend to score lower on self-report (Fresco
et al., 2007a) or objective behavioral measures (Shepherd
et al., 2016) of decentering. Improvements in decentering
consistently predict acute and enduring treatment effects for
patients suffering from MDD (Fresco et al., 2007b), GAD (Hoge
et al., 2015) and GAD (with and without MDD; Mennin et al.,
2015, under review; Renna et al., under review) as well as the
prevention of MDD relapse following prophylactic treatment
with mindfulness based cognitive therapy (Bieling et al., 2012).
However, few studies have examined the neurobehavioral
underpinnings of decentering. Some studies, primarily with
normative samples reveal patterns of neural activation in DN
and SN networks consistent with decentering’s theorized role
in reducing negative self-referentiality. For example, in a recent
study examining the meta-awareness of mind wandering, low
levels of meta-awareness were associated with greater activity
in the medial and lateral anterior PFC, PCC and precuneus
(Christoff et al., 2009). Similarly, in a sample of meditation
practitioners, Hasenkamp et al. (2012) found that greater
meta-awareness of mind wandering was linked to activity
in the bilateral anterior insula and dorsal anterior cingulate
cortex whereas mind wandering with low meta-awareness was
associated with greater activation of the PCC, medial PFC,
posterior parietal/temporal cortex, and parahippocampal gyrus
(Hasenkamp et al., 2012).
In summary, GAD and ruminative MDD patients exhibit
intense emotional experiences (e.g., somatic arousal) coupled
with excessive negative self-referentiality and low ability to
effectively decenter from their emotions and somatic responses
(e.g., Mennin and Fresco, 2013), likely reflecting disruption in
the DN and SN (e.g., insula). This potential endophenotype of
patients who frequently evidence suboptimal treatment response
to otherwise efficacious treatments motivated the development
of Emotion Regulation Therapy (ERT), which represents a
theoretically-derived, mechanism focused treatment designed to
target and normalize these hypothesized neurobehavioral deficits
(Fresco et al., 2013; Mennin et al., 2015, under review). Teaching
skills that increase one’s capacity for decentering lies at the core
of ERT and has been shown to mediate treatment gains (e.g.,
Mennin et al., under review).
Given the promising preliminary treatment efficacy evidence
for ERT, the current study sought to demonstrate treatment-
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related neurobehavioral correlates commonly associated with
mind-body phenomena that may also reflect this hypothesized
endophenotype. The current study is a secondary analysis of
the latest open label clinical trial of ERT (parent study) with
findings reported elsewhere wherein 31 patients were treated
with ERT (Renna et al., under review). Findings revealed
impressive reductions in GAD (Hedges’ g = 4.05) and MDD
(g = 2.82) severity following treatment. Similarly, patients
evidenced reductions in disability (g = 1.40) as well as gains
in perceived quality of life at post-acute treatment (g = 1.72).
Finally, patients also evidenced clinical improvement on the
ERT model variables relevant to the current study at post-acute
treatment: worry (g = 2.79), anxious arousal (g = 1.82) and
decentering (g = 2.60).
Thus, using ERT as a probe, we sought to examine the
intrinsic functional connectivity (iFC) of the DN and the insula
(as an index of the salience network) associated with treatment-
related changes in theoretically motivated model variables
(e.g., worry, anxious arousal, decentering). In particular, we
used seed-based region of interest (ROI) analyses related to
the DN (e.g., MPFC, PCC) and the insula (e.g., bilateral
anterior and posterior insular cortices), using data acquired
during resting state fMRI scans at pre-treatment. Based on
previous findings and conceptualizations, we hypothesized
that: (1) ERT will decrease negative self-referential processing
and aversive body awareness (i.e., worry and hyper focus
on bodily signals) and increase healthier self-consciousness
and detached body awareness (i.e., decentering). We also
hypothesized that; (2) changes in self-referencing (i.e., worry)
and body awareness (i.e., anxious arousal) will be predicted by
pre-treatment connectivity of specific networks (worry by DN
areas and anxious arousal by insula); and (3) in contrast, more
distributed network connectivity among nodes of the DN and
the SN (i.e., insula) at pre-treatment will be associated with
improvements in decentering.
METHOD
Participants
Participants consisted of 22 treatment seeking young adults
drawn from a larger sample (N = 31; Renna et al., under review)
of undergraduate and graduate students from a large, urban
university, who completed baseline fMRI assessments and a
16-week trial of ERT (Mennin and Fresco, 2014). Participants
were recruited through a variety of different strategies including
direct referrals from an on-campus counseling center, fliers
posted throughout campus, e-mail announcements sent to
the entire student body, and through research staff handing
out business cards to students on campus. Participants had
a mean age of 21.9 years old (SD = 2.62, Range 18–29).
Seventeen participants were female (77.3%). The sample was
racially diverse: Caucasian (36.4%), African American (9.1%),
Asian/Pacific Islander (22.7%), Other/mixed race (31.8%).
Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria
The main eligibility criterion was the presence of a primary
or secondary GAD diagnosis (primacy was determined by
clinical severity). In the current study, 16 patients had a
primary diagnosis of GAD. Sixteen patients (72.7%) also met
criteria for MDD; 14 (63.6%) patients met criteria for at least
one additional anxiety disorder diagnosis. Other diagnoses
included social anxiety disorder (n = 10), panic disorder
(n = 6), specific phobia (n = 4), obsessive compulsive disorder
(n = 3), post-traumatic stress disorder (n = 1). Participants were
required to be stabilized on any psychotropic medications for
a period of at least 3 months prior to the start of treatment
(n = 1 receiving antidepressant medication) and could not be
enrolled in any other form of psychological treatment during
the acute phase of ERT (16 weeks). Finally, participants had
to be free of active suicidal ideation/intent, psychosis, bipolar
I disorder, primary anorexia or bulimia nervosa, somatoform
disorders, or substance and alcohol dependance. Given the
use of fMRI assessment, other exclusionary criteria included
standard MRI contraindications (e.g., ferromagnetic implants;
head trauma with loss of consciousness; tattoos above the elbow;
pregnancy).
Diagnostic Assessment
Current and lifetime psychiatric disorders were assessed with
the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID; First
et al., 2002). Graduate students and senior research assistants,
extensively trained on the diagnostic assessment protocol
administered this assessment. A principal investigator and
an independent assessor, both of whom were blind to the
participant’s diagnoses assigned at the intake interview, then
confirmed participants’ diagnoses. Reliability was high, with
kappa ratings ranging from 0.708 to 1.000, demonstrating
good to excellent reliability. Reliability for diagnoses of GAD
was 100%, whereas MDD was 87.10%. Independent assessors,
who remained blind to treatment status of patients, assessed
clinical improvement at mid-treatment, post-acute treatment,
as well as three-, and 9-months following the end of
treatment.
Treatment
ERT consists of 16-session individual weekly psychotherapy
sessions completed within a 20-week span. The first half
of the treatment (Phase I) focuses on psychoeducation and
cultivating mindful emotion regulation skills. During these first
eight sessions, participants are taught attention regulation
(i.e., orienting, allowing) and meta-cognitive regulation
(i.e., distancing/decentering, and reframing) skills. In particular,
these skills include cue detection wherein individuals are
instructed on how to better attend to emotional andmotivational
cues that arise in daily life so that these cues are noticed with
greater acuity and closer to when they first arise. Cue detection
is supported by training participants in a variety of meditation
practices that improve attention and metacognitive capacities.
These meditation practices are introduced to patients who then
practice them each day. Briefer versions of these meditation
practices are also introduced so that they can be utilized in
both predicted and impromptu stressful situations to reduce a
patient’s reliance on negative self-referentiality and behavioral
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responses associated with escape or avoidance. The second
half of treatment (Phase II) focuses on context engagement,
which involves developing a proactive approach towards life
with the goal of living more consistently with one’s values
through the use of imaginal exposures and internal dialog
tasks. Here, therapists direct patients in conducting in-session
exposure exercises where patients envision a situation, goal, or
outcome that they desire but it presently missing from their
lives. This imaginal exposure serves to elucidate the motivational
inclinations for reward and approaching the goal as well as the
motivations associated with protecting one’s self from the threat
associated with taking the action and/or costs associated with not
succeeding. By giving voice to these motivational inclinations,
patients learn to decenter from the intensity of these pulls and
derive a behavioral response that reflects a more optimal balance
of risk and reward. More information regarding the structure
and specific components of ERT are described elsewhere (see
Fresco et al., 2013; Mennin and Fresco, 2014; Renna et al., under
review).
Clinicians consisted of seven doctoral students in clinical
psychology who were trained to administer ERT and received
2 h of weekly supervision. These modal number of cases treated
by each clinician was 3 (M = 2.75; Range = 1–4). To establish
adherence to the treatment protocol, all treatment sessions were
audio recorded, and a team of research assistants, not involved
in the administration of ERT or assessment of treatment effects,
coded 40% of all cases, with 25% of these cases reviewed by a
second coder to establish reliability. Reliability rates between the
coders were 100%. Coders rated the accuracy of the frequency
and skillfulness of actions taken by the study therapists.
Overall, skillfulness ratings of the therapists coded were 98.4%
(Range = 95%–100%), while frequency of actions consistent with
the treatment protocol was 91.2% (Range = 71%–100%). The
adherence ratings for this trial indicate that therapists uniformly
delivered ERT with a high degree of adherence and fidelity.
Examination of treatment effects associated with particular
clinicians revealed equivalence for self-report and clinician-
assessed clinical outcomes (p’s > 0.70) across the seven trial
therapists.
Clinical Outcomes
The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al.,
1990) is a 16-item self-report measure of pathological worry
with scores ranging from 16 to 80. This extensively used
measure has excellent psychometric properties across numerous
studies. Fresco et al. (2003) reported that scores greater or
equal to 65 reliably identified patients with a diagnosis of
GAD in a heterogenous sample of patients seeking outpatient
treatment. Cronbach’s alpha in the current sample was good
(α = 0.80).
The Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire-Short Form
(MASQ, Watson and Clark, 1991) was designed to capture
symptoms of anxiety and depression along dimensions of
Watson and Clark (1991) tripartite model. Overall, four factors
are derived—two of which demonstrate symptoms associated
with anxiety and two with depression—and yield scores for
four subscales: General Distress Anxiety, Anxious Arousal and,
General Distress Depression, Anhedonic Depression. For each
of these subscales, higher scores indicate greater anxious and
depressive symptoms, respectively. Given the focus of the
current study on somatic anxiety outcomes, only Anxious
Arousal (MASQ-AA) was examined in the present study, which
demonstrated excellent internal consistency (α = 0.91).
The Experiences Questionnaire-Decentering Subscale
(Decentering; Fresco et al., 2007a) is an 11-item measure
assessing the meta-cognitive strategy of decentering, or viewing
oneself as separate from their emotional experience. Sample
items include, ‘‘I can separate myself from my thoughts and
feelings’’, ‘‘I can observe unpleasant feelings without being drawn
into them’’, ‘‘I am consciously aware of a sense of my body as
a whole’’, and ‘‘I view things from a wider perspective’’. The
Decentering subscale has demonstrated strong psychometric
properties and treatment sensitivity. Cronbach’s alpha in the
current sample was good (α = 0.80).
Procedure
The Institutional Review Board of the college approved all aspects
of the study. Participants provided written informed consent for
all procedures at the outset of study. At the initial intake visit
participants were assessed for current and lifetime psychiatric
history via the SCID interview and also completed a battery
of self-report questionnaires delivered in paper-and-pencil
format. Prior to the start of treatment, participants completed
an independent assessment with a different interviewer who
re-assessed the diagnoses that were of clinical threshold at
the initial intake. Finally, participants completed the fMRI
scan. Following the first eight sessions (i.e., mid-treatment)
and after sixteen sessions (i.e., post-treatment), participants
returned to the lab to complete another independent assessment
and self-report questionnaire packet. They were also invited
to complete another fMRI session post-treatment, but only
the pre-treatment data are being analyzed for this study.
Participants were compensated for all research related study
visits.
Analytic Plan
MRI Data Acquisition
Imaging data were collected on a 3.0T Siemens Allegra
head-dedicated MRI scanner with a standard quadrature head
coil at the NYUCenter for Brain Imaging in NewYork, NY, USA.
Scan sessions lasted 90 min during which participants completed
a resting state fMRI scan (R-fMRI), and an anatomical scan, and
three task-based scans (not examined in the current study). The
resting state scan was always acquired prior to the task-based
scans. During the 6-min resting-state sequence, participants were
asked to keep their eyes open while a white crosshair was
displayed on a black screen. The resting-state scan comprised
180 contiguous whole-brain functional volumes, acquired using
a multi-echo echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence (repetition
time = 2000 ms; echo time = 30 ms; flip angle = 90◦; 33 slices;
matrix = 64 × 64; voxel size = 3 × 3 × 4 mm). High-resolution
T1-weighted MPRAGE structural images (TR = 2500 ms;
TE = 3.93 ms, flip = 8◦, 1 × 1 × 1 mm voxels) were
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acquired to facilitate localization and coregistration of functional
data.
MRI Data Preprocessing
MRI preprocessing and data analysis were completed using
an alpha version of an innovative software package: the
Configurable Pipeline for the Analysis of Connectomes
Version 3.9.1 (C-PAC1). CPAC is a configurable, open-
source, Nipype-based2, automated processing pipeline for
R-fMRI data. Preprocessing consisted of the following: slice
time correction (first slice as reference, interleaved acquisitions,
Fourier interpolation), 3D motion correction, despiking of
extreme time series outliers using a continuous transformation
function, spatial smoothing (FWHM = 6 mm), mean- based
intensity normalization of all volumes by the same factor,
and temporal band-pass filtering (0.01–0.1) in order to isolate
the low-frequency BOLD fluctuations of interest. Structural
images were registered to a common stereotaxic space (Montreal
Neurological Institute, MNI) using Advanced Normalization
Tools (Avants et al., 20113). Functional image registration was
completed using Boundary Based Registration as implemented
in FSL (Greve and Fischl, 2009). Single participant nuisance
regression included linear and quadratic trends, 24 Friston
motion parameters (Friston et al., 1996), and five CompCor
signals (Behzadi et al., 2007). All analyses were Gaussian random
field (GRF) corrected at p< 0.05, Z > 2.3.
As micromovements have been shown to potentially
introduce artifactual correlations, mean framewise displacement
(FD) was computed, per recently described methods (Power
et al., 2012; Van Dijk et al., 2012). No subjects were excluded on
the basis of motion (all had mean FD < 0.25 mm). To further
control for the impact of motion on group results, each subject’s
mean FD was included as a covariate in group-level analyses.
Region of Interest Selection
To test study hypotheses, we utilized ROIs from the (DN) and
the insula (see Figure 1). Three spherical ROI seeds (2 mm
radius) were created to assess DN iFC based on Andrews-
Hanna et al. (2010): the anterior MPFC (aMPFC) and PCC
were selected because they represent hubs of the DN, and the
dorsal (dMPFC) was selected to probe the dMPFC subsystem
which has been implicated in social cognition, mentalizing and
introspection about mental states (e.g., Wagner et al., 2016). Due
to insufficient coverage of medial temporal and ventral prefrontal
regions (see Figure 2), we were unable to examine the medial
temporal lobe (MTL) subsystem. Anatomical bilateral posterior
and anterior insula ROIs were taken from the two-cluster
parcellation results from a recent multimodal examination of the
functional organization of the insula (Kelly et al., 2012).
The mean time series of each ROI seed was calculated by
averaging the time series of all voxels within each ROI. For
each participant, ROI connectivity strength was assessed across
the whole brain using Pearson correlations between the ROI
time series and all other voxels in the brain. This resulted in
1http://fcp-indi.github.io/
2http://nipy.org/nipype/
3http://www.picsl.upenn.edu/ANTS
FIGURE 1 | Group mask (n = 22) indicating coverage of fMRI signal.
FIGURE 2 | Insula and default network (DN) regions of interest (ROIs).
individual Fisher’s Z-transformed participant-level maps of all
voxels exhibiting significant iFC with the aMPFC, vMPFC and
PCC, anterior insula (bilateral) and posterior insula (bilateral;
GRF corrected: p< 0.05, Z > 2.3).
Group Level MRI Analyses
Three separate group-level analyses were conducted using a
random-effects, ordinary least-squares model in FSL FEAT4 to
assess the associations between iFC and worry, anxious arousal
and decentering. Each model included three nuisance regressors
(age, sex and mean FD), the pre-treatment measure of interest
as a covariate, and post-treatment measure of interest as the
primary predictor. Group-level analyses were conducted using
cluster-level GRF theory for multiple comparison correction
(p < 0.05, Z > 2.3) resulting in thresholded Z-score maps
indicating clusters where iFC of each ROI was significantly
related to the post-treatment variable of interest. To conduct
additional post hoc analyses, we extracted the average partial
regression coefficients for each significant cluster for each
participant.
Corrections for Multiple Comparisons
Although all theoretically motivated and defensible, the analyses
reported herein did use three ROI seeds associated with the DN
and four ROI seeds associated with the salience network. Thus,
to prevent the likelihood of Type I statistical errors, we report
findings with p values less than 0.05 and make note of findings
that do not survive a Bonferroni correction of 0.05/3 in the DN
and 0.05/4 in the salience network.
4https://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk
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RESULTS
Pre-Treatment iFC Associated with
Treatment-Related Changes in Worry
Regression analyses estimated from changes in worry revealed
associations with iFC of both the DN and insula. With respect
to the DN, reduced iFC of the aMPFC with posterior regions
including the precuneus and the occipital cortex, was associated
with greater reductions (improvement) in worry following
treatment (see Table 1 and Figure 3A). No significant results
were observed for the PCC or dMPFCROI analyses.With respect
to the insula, greater reductions in worry following treatment
were associated with weaker iFC of right anterior and posterior
insula with the superior parietal lobe (see Figure 3B). A similar
cluster was observed for the right anterior insula but this did
not survive Bonferroni correction (p > 0.0125). No significant
clusters emerged for the left insula.
Pre-Treatment iFC Associated with
Treatment-Related Changes in Somatic
Anxiety
Regression analyses estimated from changes in somatic anxiety
revealed no significant findings for any of the DN ROIs.
However, similar to the worry analyses, reduced iFC between
bilateral posterior insula ROIs and a cluster in the superior
parietal lobe was associated with greater reductions in somatic
anxiety. See Table 1 and Figure 3B. Additionally, greater iFC
between the left posterior insula and inferior parietal lobe was
associated with lower post-treatment anxious arousal, as shown
in Figure 3A. No results were found for the right or left anterior
insula.
Pre-Treatment iFC Associated with
Treatment-Related Changes in
Decentering
Finally, regression analyses estimated from changes in
decentering revealed associations with iFC of both the DN
and insula. Reduced iFC between the aMPFC and a cluster
in occipital lobe was associated with higher post-treatment
decentering scores (greater improvement). Of note, this cluster
overlapped with that obtained in the aMPFC iFC analysis
for worry. Multiple regions emerged from the dMPFC iFC
analysis. Here, greater iFC between dMPFC and the left
anterior insula/inferior frontal gyrus was associated with higher
post-treatment decentering. Clusters were also detected in the
rostral ACC extending to striatum and superior frontal gyrus
but these did not survive correction for multiple comparisons
(p’s> 0.017). Finally, greater connectivity between the PCC ROI
and a cluster extending from dorsal to rostral ACC and a cluster
encompassing striatum and anterior insula was associated
TABLE 1 | Clusters with significant associations in relation to clinical change in worry, somatic anxiety and decentering.
Cluster size x y z Max Z p
Worry with DN ROIs
aMPFC
Precuneus 368 18 −78 42 4.59 0.00269∗
Occipital cortex 539 −8 −80 18 4.31 0.000119∗
Worry with insula ROIs
Right posterior insula
Superior parietal cortex 241 −30 −38 40 3.77 0.00897∗
Right anterior insula
Inferior parietal cortex 189 −50 −28 42 4.3 0.0484
Somatic anxiety with insula ROIs
Right posterior insula
Superior parietal lobe 251 −34 −36 40 3.85 0.00517∗
Left posterior insula
Superior parietal lobe 433 −32 −38 48 3.9 0.000125∗
Inferior parietal lobe 269 46 −38 28 2.24 0.00573∗
Decentering with DN ROIs
aMPFC
Occipital pole 336 16 −90 16 3.68 0.00407∗
dMPFC
Rostral ACC 225 0 42 0 4.62 0.0486
Superior frontal gyrus 226 −2 −2 68 4.18 0.0475
Left anterior insula/inferior frontal gyrus 363 −26 12 −16 3.81 0.00258∗
PCC
Striatum (caudate and putamen) 537 −20 8 −8 3.48 0.000329∗
Rostral ACC 606 2 36 4 3.95 0.000113∗
Decentering with insula ROIs
Right posterior insula
Lateral occipital cortex 245 −42 −80 −14 3.77 0.021
Right anterior insula
Central opercular cortex 220 −42 −22 18 4.31 0.0361
Note: ∗Denotes findings that survive a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons.
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FIGURE 3 | (A,B) Intrinsic functional connectivity (iFC) of default and salience regions associated with treatment-related changes in Worry and Somatic Anxiety
Findings. (C) IFC of default and salience regions associated with treatment-related changes in Decentering. aMPFC, anterior medial prefrontal cortex region of
interest; dMPFC, dorsal medial prefrontal cortex region of interest; PCC, posterior cingulate cortex region of interest.
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with greater improvements in decentering. With respect to
the insula, greater iFC between the right posterior insula and
lateral occipital cortex as well as iFC between the right anterior
insula and central opercular cortex were associated with higher
decentering at post-treatment. However, these findings were
no longer significant after controlling for multiple comparisons
(p’s > 0.0125). No significant results were found for the left
insula. See Table 1 and Figure 3C.
DISCUSSION
The present study took a novel approach to examining the
neural predictors of specific outcomes of ERT for GAD patients
with and without comorbid MDD. In particular, much of
the psychological theorizing about the nature of GAD and
MDD in terms of disruption of mind and body has been
predicated on a functional relationship between the kinds and
intensity of visceral and psychological sensations that one
experiences (i.e., motivational intensity) and the ways by which
one attempts to respond to their arising (i.e., negative self-
referentiality; Borkovec et al., 2004; Nolen-Hoeksema et al.,
2008; Watkins, 2008; Newman and Llera, 2011; Mennin and
Fresco, 2013, 2014; Olatunji et al., 2013). Extending this model
to an examination of neurobehavioral systems that subserve
emotion and motivation (i.e., salience network) as well as
self-referential mentation (i.e., DN) motivated the current
study, in which we focused on two constructs characteristic
of the pathology of GAD and MDD, worry and somatic
anxiety, and one treatment-related construct associated with
reduced negative self-referentiality, decentering. From a neural
perspective, we hypothesized that change in these variables
would be differentially associated with the iFC of insula-based
and DN regions. Specifically, because worry is regarded as
a destructive form of self-referentiality, we hypothesized that
changes in worry would be related primarily to DN connectivity.
Conversely, we hypothesized that changes in somatic anxiety
would be associated primarily with pre-treatment insula iFC.
Finally, given that decentering is a metacognitive capacity
associated with reductions in negative self-referentiality and a
consistent mechanism of clinical improvement, we predicted that
gains in decentering would be associated with both DN and
insula iFC at pre-treatment.
Overall, we found some distinctions between iFC patterns
associated with improvements in worry and somatic anxiety,
although there was greater overlap than predicted. As
hypothesized, DN iFC was associated with treatment-related
reductions in worry but not in somatic anxiety. Specifically,
individuals with weaker iFC between the anterior MPFC and
posterior regions demonstrated greater improvements in worry.
Conversely, insula iFC was not unique to changes in somatic
anxiety. Although individuals with weaker pre-treatment
iFC between bilateral posterior insula and superior parietal
lobe showed greater improvements in somatic anxiety, iFC
of right anterior and posterior insula with same regions was
also associated with changes in worry. This pattern of results
bears some resemblance to the findings of Kaiser et al. (2015),
who in their recent meta-analysis of MDD, reported abnormal
connectivity patterns in both the dorsal and ventral attention
networks, potentially reflecting altered or biased salience
monitoring. Similarly, Andreescu et al. (2014) found that broad
scale hyperconnectivity of the insulae was associated with greater
GAD severity. Further, Paulus and Stein (2010) postulate a role
of negative self-referentiality in aberrant insula activity. The
findings from the current study are largely consistent with this
interpretation and suggest that weaker pre-treatment iFC of
the insula (both posterior and anterior ROIs) with regions of
the dorsal attention network (i.e., post-central gyrus, superior
parietal lobe) is a non-specific indicator of ERT treatment
gains.
Psychological models have identified decentering as a
metacognitive process that occurs naturally in individuals but
can be cultivated by psychosocial interventions, especially
interventions that include training in mindfulness meditation
(e.g., Bernstein et al., 2015). Decentering is central to the
ERT treatment model as it represents an important mechanism
of change (Mennin and Fresco, 2013, 2014; Mennin et al.,
under review). Bernstein et al. (2015) posit that decentering
helps individuals reduce time spent engaging in negative
self-referentiality and allowing them to better attend to cues
associated with goal directed behavior; thus, we postulated that
ROIs from both the default and salience networks would be
associated with ERT linked gains in decentering. Consistent
with our initial predictions, clinical gains in decentering were
associated with pretreatment iFC of several ROIs from the
DN and the insula. With respect to the DN, findings revealed
that reduced connectivity between the anterior MPFC and
the occipital pole at baseline was associated with greater
increases in decentering over the course of ERT. This finding is
comparable to that of reduced anterior MPFC—occipital cortex
iFC predicting improvement in worry suggesting overlap in these
constructs (or in treatment gains related to these constructs).
As reflected in the operational definition of decentering and
the content of items in the decentering subscale, decentering
is believed to be a metacognitive capacity that leads to
less self-referentially biased awareness of exteroceptive and
interoceptive cues. Similarly, previous task-based work has
shown that reduced co-activation of these regions predicts
greater prevention of relapse in patients with remitted depression
(Farb et al., 2011). It may be that reduced connectivity
between the aMPFC and visual processing regions is associated
with less negative self-referentiality and greater engagement
of imagery (i.e., potentially indicating emotional processing;
Foa and Kozak, 1986). Individuals with GAD are suggested
to engage in verbally-based processing (i.e., worry) as a
strategy for avoiding intense and aversive internal experiences
(Borkovec et al., 2004). Similarly, individuals with MDD
show reduced concreteness during rumination (Watkins and
Moulds, 2007), and individuals with MDD and anxiety
disorders, including GAD, show a reduced ability to generate
prospective positive imagery (Morina et al., 2011). Greater
imagery engagement may indicate emotional processing (e.g.,
Foa and Kozak, 1986) and therefore be important in treating
disorders involving a high level of perseverative cognitive
processing—for example, an interpretation modification bias
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paradigm found that imagining positive future events, vs.
thinking about their meaning in words, had a protective effect
against a subsequent negative mood induction (Holmes et al.,
2009).
Greater pretreatment connectivity of the dMFPC and PCC
ROIs with various regions were associated with greater gains
in decentering. One area that evidenced greater connectivity
to the PCC was the rostral ACC. Although the ACC is
broadly associated with many neural functions including conflict
monitoring and adaptation (i.e., confronting and resolving
situations marked with conflicting information, Botvinick et al.,
2001; Etkin et al., 2006), particular connectivity between the
dMPFC and the rostral ACC has been implicated in the
conscious appraisal of emotion (Etkin et al., 2011), which seems
consistent with one’s ability to decenter from negative emotions.
Likewise, connectivity between the rostral ACC and the MPFC
may simply reflect its role within the default network (e.g.,
Buckner et al., 2008). Interestingly, recent findings implicate
hypoactivation of the rostral ACC especially in conjunction with
the MPFC in emotion regulation deficits in GAD (Klumpp
et al., 2011; Mochcovitch et al., 2014). Recent theories suggest
that the rostral ACC may be a node for more implicit
emotion regulation, especially when not co-activated with aspects
of the dorsal attention network (i.e., DLPFC, dorsal ACC;
Christoff et al., 2011). Thus, this greater connectivity observed
between the rostral ACC to the PCC may reflect increased
ability to notice and resolve emotionally laden self-relevant
information, which in turn could facilitate treatment-linked
gains in decentering.
With respect to the observed connectivity between the
dMPFC with the left anterior insula/IFG cluster, these areas
have been implicated in effective emotion regulation especially
in the context of affect labeling (e.g., putting feeling into
words; Lieberman et al., 2007) among individuals with high
trait mindfulness (Creswell et al., 2007). Such connectivity may
suggest that adaptive emotion regulation requires coordination
between the default and salience networks. Although no studies
have formally examined decentering in the context of affect
labeling, these two constructs are conceptually similar. Thus,
these patterns of findings may indicate that pretreatment iFC in
these regions facilitates gains in decentering for patients receiving
ERT.
Findings from the current study add to a growing body of
research demonstrating the clinical efficacy and hypothesized
mechanism model of ERT (Mennin and Fresco, 2013, 2014).
For instance, in the context of a randomized clinical trial
using a modified attentional control as the comparator,
Mennin et al. (under review) reported acute and enduring
treatment effects for patients receiving ERT for a broad
range of clinical outcomes associated with GAD and MDD
(Hedge’s g’s of 0.48–1.50). Treatment effects in that trial were
mediated by gains in self-reported decentering (e.g., Fresco
et al., 2007b). Similarly, one mechanism finding from an
earlier ERT trial consistent with the present findings relates to
heart rate variability, an index of parasympathetic flexibility
(Porges, 2001; Thayer et al., 2012). Heart rate variability was
assessed while watching a fearful film in a subset of ERT
patients from prior trials. At pre-treatment, patients displayed
a flattened response throughout the experimental period,
suggesting reduced cardiac flexibility. At mid-treatment,
patients displayed a quadratic pattern of vagal withdrawal
(i.e., reactivity) and vagal rebound (d = 0.81). This relative
normalization of parasympathetic flexibility from pre- to
mid-treatment predicted treatment gains in diagnostic
severity, anxiety and mood symptoms (Mennin et al., in
preparation).
Although these findings are encouraging, they must be
regarded as preliminary given some notable limitations. First,
our sample was relatively small (N = 22), which prevented
us from examining specific effects in patients with GAD with
and without MDD to assess the impact of this comorbidity.
It also prevented more sophisticated hierarchical analyses that
would include all three constructs in one model. Our small
sample, comprised mostly of women, also did not allow us to
adequately test gender differences in treatment response and
neural patterns. However, this imbalance in gender distribution
favoring women is consistent with treatment seeking patterns
for all anxiety disorders including GAD (e.g., McLean et al.,
2011). Second, the findings are based upon patients receiving
ERT in an open-label format. Thus, this trial lacked a comparator
treatment to contrast the potential association of pre-treatment
neural activations to treatment changes uniquely attributable
to ERT. These limitations speak to the need of a larger
ERT trial with a proper comparator arm and an assessment
schedule with multiple fMRI visits—thereby allowing for a
careful examination of ERT specific neural changes associated
with clinical improvement for patients suffering from GAD
and MDD. Finally, our MRI acquisition did not allow us to
adequately image and examine the MTL subsystem including
the bilateral amygdala, which has been implicated in GAD and
MDD (Roy et al., 2013; Oathes et al., 2015). Although the specific
hypotheses of the current study were not unduly affected by this
limitation, future studies will benefit from MRI acquisition that
can simultaneously examine all the neural systems associated
with GAD and MDD.
Despite these limitations, the present findings add to the
growing body of research implicating disruptions in the DN
and salience networks in GAD and MDD and demonstrate
the association of functional connectivity in these networks to
patterns of treatment-related changes in central components
of these disorders (i.e., worry, somatic anxiety) and their
amelioration (i.e., decentering).
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